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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that the answer to the question of whether the impact of corruption on 
development is homogenous, is no. Our optimism rest on how development may be 
conceptualized. When equated to a narrow measure in economic-wise which fundamentally 
ignores critical issues, then there is a possibility the outlook could be positive. But when 
conceptualized using a broad-based approach such as sustainable development, then the outlook 
could be negative. We assess a panel of 22 economies in Sub-Sahara Africa with the most recent 
dataset (1996-2013) from the World Bank and other reputable agencies. Our finding is quite 
robust. It holds in POLS, Fixed effects and GMM within IV settings; and it also holds for different 
measures of institutions and different measures of development using growth per capita GDP and 
genuine wealth per capita respectively. Taking stock of major policy blue-prints of selected 
countries in the region on the fight against corruption, we are able to point out that institutions play 
important role in insulating citizens against the devastation caused by corruption. Overall, through 
this comparison, we are able to signal that both incidental and systematic corruption poses a long-
term threat to sustainable development. 
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1. Introduction 
Contemporary works on the devastating effects of corruption have mainly been explored 
in relation to economic development at the macro and micro levels (see Bardhan, 1997; Forson et 
al., 2015; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Pellegrini, 2011; Saha & Mallik, 2012; Sharma, 2007; Ugur, 
2014), ignoring issues that pertain to sustainability. As a consequence, resource-rich economies 
are increasingly at risk of losing out through over exploitation. It is a well-established fact that 
Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) is blessed with diverse natural resources and thus has often been 
described as the resource basket of the world. Yet it is the continent housed to over two-thirds of 
the world’s poorest (Oxfam, 2014). A preliminary report to assess performance of countries in 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have shown that most countries in the region 
might not be able to meet the set targets (UN- MDG, 2013). That notwithstanding, donor supports 
to extricate the continent from the doldrums of poverty has been unprecedented. A recent report 
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suggest that even though there has been a significant drop in development assistance by 16% from 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to least developed 
economies, the fraction of foreign aid was close to a record peak after donors were reported to 
have spent a staggering $135 billion in 2014 (see Anderson, 2015). 
With the link between foreign aid inflows and development in the region being so fuzzy, it 
has generated another discourse laden with a conjecture that the plight of Africa may be as a result 
of the continued inflows of aid undercut by all forms of corruption (see Forson et al., 2015; Knack, 
2013; Ohler et al., 2012).Thus corruption regardless of its form and magnitude is generally 
devastating and inimical to well-being. Yet the bane can be mitigated when government machinery 
is reinvented through institutional reforms and effective policy decisions (Forson et al.,2016; 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). It should be pointed out that until Ugur’s comprehensive meta-analysis 
on this linkage (Ugur, 2014), it was thought the corruption-development relationship have always 
supported the notion of promoting growth  (Bardhan, 1997; Forson, 2016; Leff, 1964; Saha & 
Mallik, 2012; Wang & You, 2012). 
The contribution of this paper therefore is to reexamine and compare contemporary 
macroeconomic question of the effect of corruption on growth in Africa taking into account the 
element of sustainability drawn from the concept of sustainable development. This feeds into the 
general question of whether the impact of corruption on development is homogenous regardless 
of how development is conceptualized. We as a result compare the effects of corruption on two 
but related development outcomes; economic development (ED) and sustainable development 
(SD). Our research in this regard differs from others regarding the context and analytical rigor. We 
in this attempt emphasize the need for Africa to conceptualize its development trajectory on the 
basis of sustainability using a broad-based approach as opposed to the reliance on Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP) per capita which measures progress in economic dimension given the flaws it has. 
GDP may under or overestimate the impact of corruption given that a higher level of GDP growth 
may be misconstrued to imply the economy is doing well in the light of the explanatory variable(s) 
being considered. However, when development is conceptualized on the basis of sustainability 
with a corresponding measure that takes into account the four dimensions of sustainable 
development, the true state of the effect is well appreciated. This is something that 
is conspicuously lacking on the academic and policy circles on the African continent. We 
operationally define an economy to be sustainable when the course of actions or inactions by policy 
makers does not in any way decrease the inter-temporal welfare of generations over time. 
It is also important to note that even though there are studies that purport to have explored 
this connection on the continent, they rather turned to be qualitatively inclined needing empirical 
proof (see Bamidele, 2013; Claros, 2013; Nwaobi, 2013). We also observed most of these studies 
fundamentally lost track of the basic principle of sustainable development (see Harris, 2000) by 
either focusing on just an aspect to represent the whole. It is our belief working on the flaws of the 
World Bank sanctioned measure of sustainability using the Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) allows 
us to contribute on the empirics of sustainable development on the continent using corruption as a 
key explanatory variable. Thus the use of genuine wealth per capita addresses these flaws by 
incorporating population dynamism.  
On the analytical rigor, genuine wealth per capita is computed by the authors for the sample 
following accounting procedure suggested in the literature (Aidt, 2010; Arrow et al., 2003; 
3 
 
Dasgupta & Maher, 2000). For consistency, three estimation techniques are used. These estimation 
strategies and the number of controls allow the authors to deal with issues pertaining to 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Moreover, the authors’ decision to link anti-corruption 
initiatives in SSA adds to the uniqueness of the paper as it allows a direct synergy to be made 
between the data and what is indeed on the ground. Readers can easily relate the empirical findings 
to the efforts in place to better understand the points being driven at. 
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature with respect to 
economic and sustainable outcomes. Sub of this section is a snapshot of anticorruption initiatives 
in selected countries. Data and methodology are presented and outlined in Section 3. Empirical 
analysis and discussion are concurrently covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and draws 
important implications for future recommendation. 
  
2. Corruption-Development Perspectives 
2.1. Grease vs. Sand 
Since 1987 when the official definition of sustainable development became 
known as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs (Brundtland Commission, 1987), it has suffered from operational 
challenges due to variation in living standards across countries. Consequentially, research 
activities have increasingly been tied to economic rather than sustainable outcomes, thus allowing 
considerable number of research publications brought out on the theoretical linkages between 
corruption and economic outcomes. Early proponents of this relationship such as Leff (1964) and 
others controversially posits that where the institutional framework is not appropriate, especially 
where there is bureaucratic restrictions, corruption facilitates trade that would not have occurred 
without it (see Saha, & Mallik, 2012). Various researchers have responded to this assumption, with 
both theoretical and empirical studies. Mauro was among the early scholars who was able to 
demonstrate the existence of significant negative correlation between corruption and private 
investment; with a consequential result that suggested that corruption reduces economic growth 
Mauro (1995). This created a fertile ground for other researchers to wade into the debate which 
has given rise to divisions between supporters of the positive effect of corruption on economic 
development on one side, who apparently came to be known as the “grease-in-the-wheel” strand, 
and proponents of the negative effect, also known as the “sand-in-the-wheel” strand. 
Thus the sympathizers of these perspectives document extensive relationship between 
corruption and economic growth but with divergent views. Some researchers argue that corruption 
may serve to ensure that projects are awarded to the most efficient firms, who may cut their way 
through bribe payment (Bardhan, 1997). Yet competing arguments point out that existing practice 
in more corrupt societies tend to encourage the most able to engage in rent-seeking activities. There 
is therefore an assumption that the most successful in rent-seeking in the society are the 
beneficiaries of corrupt practices, and not the most economically efficient. The reallocation of 
talents from productive to rent-seeking activities is seen to impact negatively on economic growth. 
Other literature further documents that corruption reduces both investment and growth (Murphy 
et al., 1993). In addition, Romer (1994) suggests that corruption, by imposing a tax on ex-post 
profits may in general reduce the flow of new goods and technology, particularly in a situation 
where an initial fixed cost investment is a prerequisite (see Sharma 2007). In other words, there is 
a general assumption that suggests that corruption poses as an uncertainty in itself which ultimately 
serve to reduce investment flows. Mo in his seminal paper shares this analogy and concludes that 
corruption reduces the level of human and private investment (Mo, 2001). Corruption could be a 
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barrier to investors, with less investment leading to slower economic growth. Likewise, a high 
level of corruption negatively affects foreign direct investment. In other circles, corruption could 
introduce an element of competition for government resources, and such competition could lead 
to government services being offered more efficiently (Wang & You, 2012). 
2.2. Going beyond GDP per capita: Sustainability Perspective 
A consideration of the perspectives briefly discussed here and elsewhere shows that most 
of the empirical studies on the consequences of corruption on wellbeing country-wide have mainly 
focused on the use of GDP per capita albeit the delimitation it harbors. Yet according to Aidt 
(2010), development is supposed to be concerned with sustainable improvements in human welfare 
and not spontaneous improvement. Indeed, the same study suggests that GDP per capita is not 
necessarily a good measure of such improvements. There is therefore a general call to direct 
research questions to sustainable development rather than economic development (Costanza et al., 
2009; Forson, 2016; Smits & Hoekstra, 2011).  
In response to this call, recent studies make use of an alternate measure of development 
which is welfare driven. This measure has been sanctioned by the World Bank owing to 
environmental concerns on climate change among others. Thus the adjusted net savings (ANS) or 
genuine investment emerged as an appropriate measure of sustainability. However, it has been 
criticized among others as being unable to incorporate population dynamisms (Dietz & Neumayer, 
2005; Everett & Wilk, 1999). Pending these limitations, the World Bank and others have extended 
this measure with some accounting deductions (see Aidt, 2010; Arrow et al., 2003; Hamilton, 
1999). The indicator genuine wealth per capita became the by-product of these adjustments and is 
now being used as a measure of sustainability to reflect the true level of investment and 
disinvestment in the productive base of an economy. 
Since then, there have been quite a few number of empirical research on the sustainability 
strand. For instance, Venard (2013), using genuine wealth growth per capita as a proxy for 
sustainable development concludes that corruption has a negative effect on sustainable 
development, but was quick to also point out that such a negative effect was well understood when 
institutional variables such as democracy and governance was used as control variables. Similar 
finding has been reported by Aidt (2010) in which a negative correlation was found between a 
range of wider corruption indices and growth in genuine wealth per capita. In investigating the 
relationship between corruption, resource curse and genuine savings, Dietz et al. (2007) points out 
that institutional quality depresses growth. When genuine and gross saving is regressed on three 
indicators of institutional quality (rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption), the finding 
reported suggest that reducing corruption has a positive impact on genuine saving in interaction 
with resource abundance. 
From these perspectives, it can be pointed out that the corruption-development connection 
is not straightforward but then the linkage is much clearer pending the pro-activeness of 
institutions and other economic and noneconomic fundamentals. These factors are used in the 
baseline econometric model in this study. 
  
2.3 An Overview of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Selected African Countries 
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In SSA, combating corruption has been a major component in the repertoire of 
rationalizations for the overthrow of governments, both constitutional and unconstitutional. 
Notable among a host of strategies adopted to mitigate this social canker includes executions by 
firing squad and the imposition of lengthy custodian sentences. In addition to these efforts, major 
blue-prints (manifestoes) of successive political parties have captured an aspect of these ant-
corruption strategies which include promises to fight corruption, with each party pledging on rally 
platforms to fight corruption better than their opponents. Other anti-corruption strategies have 
focused on the moral aspect of the society where the help of religious and community leaders have 
been the target to goad citizens to uphold the values of integrity and to manifest high moral ethics 
in their personal lives. Ghana and other countries in the western corridor of Africa have ratified 
other international pacts on corruption such as the UNCAC and the AU Convention in 2005, and 
the ECOWAS Protocol in 2003 (GoG 2011). Regardless of these developments, corruption still 
remains a reality. 
Similar anti-corruption initiatives have been formulated and implemented in other 
countries in the sub-region. But in Nigeria, previous anti-corruption initiatives have just been in 
theory with less practicality in tracking down the menace. As a result, the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Corruption Commission (EFCC) was 
established in 2003 in reaction to pressure from Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF) and among other things to combat corruption at various levels (Aibieyi, 2007). 
The impact has been less desirable. In Tanzania, public sector corruption used not to be a problem 
especially after independence, but in the early 90s crippling problem of incidental and systematic 
corruption undermined the economically liberalized Multi-party state. Presidential inquiry into 
alleged corruption became common (Warioba, 1997). Since 1994, there have been many 
corruption scandals in Tanzania and as such government had to respond against the backdrop of 
the impending election in 1995. Promises to fight corruption (anti-corruption commitments) 
became the central theme of the messages preached by politician. The Prevention and combating 
of Corruption Bureau (PCB) was established to spearhead the fight on corruption, although the 
Warioba Commission reported in its inquiry that the anticorruption agency lacked political 
commitment, hence being ineffective. The ineffectiveness of the bureau stemmed from it being 
under-resourced to act (Riley, 1998; Warioba, 1997). Since 2008, a major reform swept across this 
agency to streamline its mandate and efficiency in dealing with the canker. This led to the name 
being changed to Prevention and Combating Corruption Bureau (PCCB) to reflect the agency’s 
mandate (von Wogau, 2010). Even though the agency has worked to increase the awareness of 
corruption in Tanzania; the lack of resource capacities has indeed militated against its core 
mandate. Indeed, recent report in the wildlife industry buttresses this claim with corruption and 
abuse reported to be rife within the wildlife sector with impunity. Tourist and hunt operators have 
consistently failed to pay fees to authorities, and authorities have likewise failed to pay villages 
royalties due them. 
In Kenya, a conscious effort has been made to combat corruption as reflected in the vision 
and mission of the Kenyan anti-corruption commission. These anti-corruption strategies have been 
aligned with the country’s 2030 development agenda and on a larger scale aims to strengthen 
existing institutional framework to foster zero tolerance to corruption in Kenya. Having realized 
the challenges besetting socio-economic transformation and the need to address corruption, the 
Government established the Kenya Ant-corruption commission (KACC) in 2003 under section 6 
of the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) of 2003 to combat and prevent 
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corruption. The first strategic plan covering 2006-2009 was implemented to its logical conclusion 
and this was followed by the second strategic plan covering 2009-2012 (KACC, 2009). 
In the year 2000, the government of Sierra Leone enacted the Anti-corruption Act which 
paved the way for the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The Act was 
repealed and replaced with the 2008 Act in an attempt to effectuate and enhance efficiency 
regarding its core mandate. These measures have been instituted to enhance existing strategies. 
For example, the enactment of anti-corruption laws such as the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone 
as amended, the Anti-Corruption Act 2008, the National Public Procurement Act, 2004 and its 
Regulations of 2006, the Criminal Procedures Act, 1965, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2005, 
the Finance Act, 2009, the Banking Act, 2000, and other Common Law offences relating to 
financial accountability and Government and Accountability Act 2006 attest to this drive (ACA, 
2012). It should be pointed out that the measures afore discussed have been tailored towards 
combating existing forms and manifestation of corruption as shown in Table 1. Moreover, most of 
these initiatives have been harmonized with emerging international initiatives to fight corruption, 
including the world community’s adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) in 2003. The African Union (AU) Convention against Corruption 2005 and the 
ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (ECOWAS Protocol) were adopted at the 
regional and sub-regional levels respectively. 
Regardless of these measures, the forms and manifestation of corruption listed in Table 1 
drawn from DeLeon (1993) and Riley (1998) are still prevalent which could undermine the ideals 
of sustainable development. 
 
Table 1. Types of Corruption in sub-Sahara Africa 
1. Incidental 
- Small-scale; 
- Involves junior public officials: policemen, custom and tax officials 
- Impact on economy mild, but profound public alienation; 
- Difficult to check 
2. Systematic 
- Impact on development larger 
- Affects most or all government  departments or agencies 
- May substantially impact upon government revenues and trade diversion; 
- Sustained reform rather than individualized response needed 
3. Systemic 
- Government by theft 
- Impact to development huge (e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire, Charles Taylor’s Liberia, Moi’s 
Kenya etc.) 
- Honesty is ‘irrational’ 
Source: Authors’ construct drawn from DeLeon (1993) and Riley (1998) 
 
In Table 2 except South Africa and Botswana, the control of corruption in Africa have consistently 
fallen below the 70 mark global percentile score which seriously cast doubts on the effectiveness 
of anticorruption measures. The devastating effect is well magnified (see Figure A-1) when 
genuine wealth per capita is compared with GDP growth rate per capita. This tentatively has the 
implication to suggest that existing institutions in the region may not been able to insulate the 
ordinary citizenry from the impact of corruption. Yet the core mandate of institutions is to control 
7 
 
the prospects and incentives for politicians and bureaucrats to engage in the “sale of public assets 
for private gains” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
 
 
Table 2. World Bank measure of Control of Corruption in selected years (1996-2013) in SSA 
      Global percentile score     
Region Year 1996 2000 2004 2007 2013 
Sub-Sahara Africa       
 Ghana 49.27 58.05 49.76 58.74 56.46 
 Nigeria 8.78 5.85 6.34 14.08 9.09 
 South Africa 78.54 73.17 70.73 61.65 54.55 
 Kenya 15.12 14.15 22.44 18.93 12.92 
 Senegal 49.27 57.07 56.10 35.44 50.24 
 Malawi 49.27 52.20 23.90 35.92 31.10 
 Zimbabwe 44.39 15.12 5.85 3.40 2.87 
 Cameroun 7.32 8.78 11.71 16.02 9.57 
 Botswana 74.63 75.12 80.00 79.13 79.43 
 Uganda 28.78 20.98 24.88 21.84 13.88 
 Gabon 16.10 36.59 23.41 12.14 36.36 
Source: Authors’ construct data from World Bank 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We assess a panel of 22 countries with the most recent dataset (1996-2013) from the World 
Bank and other reputable agencies. The criteria for selecting these countries was purely based on 
data availability. There are two dependent variables: growth in GDP per capita and genuine wealth 
per capita. Our main research variable is the perceived level of corruption. We depend on thirteen 
variables made of the governance indicators and growth related factors from the literature to infer 
relation: government effective, bureaucratic quality, regulatory quality, rule of law, press freedom, 
British colonial heritage, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, population growth, openness 
(economic freedom), economic prosperity, foreign aid inflows, natural resources and human 
capital endowments using primary and secondary enrollments. Most of these variables have 
broadly been classified as policy variables in the growth literature. 
8 
 
These variables have been extensively used in the corruption literature (Asongu, 2013; 
Dong & Torgler, 2013; Forson et al., 2015; Jain, 2002; Treisman, 2000). Most of these studies 
have stressed on the importance of institutions and for that matter governance structures in 
understanding the relationship between corruption and development in the contemporary 
world (Asongu, 2013; Pellegrini, 2011). Thus on this basis, the choice of variables in this research 
is fully justified by empirical and theoretical literature. Corresponding summary statistics, variable 
descriptions and presentation of countries (Table A-1), and correlation matrix (Table A-2) are 
detailed in the appendices respectively. 
 
3.2 Derivation of Sustainability Measure and Model Specification 
Following the analytical approaches of Aidt, (2010), Arrow et al., (2003), Dasgupta & 
Maher, (2000), Pellegrini (2011) and others, the study assumes that a society populated by many 
identical individuals will live forever, where time (t) is continuous. Further modification is made 
by assuming that the population size is fixed. The economy produces an all-purpose good (𝑌𝑡) 
from factor inputs: labor (𝐿𝑡), manufactured capital (𝐾𝑡), and the flow of natural resources(𝑅𝑡). 
The production technology is represented as: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝑅𝑡)                                                                                                                                     (1) 
Where  𝐹 increases in each of the three arguments and is continuously differentiable. The 
production function need not be concave. This relation allows the findings to be applicable to a 
range of economies factoring in other externalities including market and government failures. 
Manufactured capital changes over time according to the following law of motion: 𝑑𝐾𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝑅𝑡) − 𝐶𝑡 ≡  𝐼𝑡𝑘                                                                                                              (2)  
Where 𝐶𝑡 is aggregate consumption, 𝐼𝑡𝑘 is investment in manufactured capital assumed to 
be without any depreciation. The natural resource base (𝑆𝑡) changes according to the following 
law of motion: 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝑀(𝑆𝑡, ) − 𝑟𝑡 ≡  𝐼𝑡𝑠                                                                                                                           (3)  
Where 𝑀(𝑆𝑡, ) is the natural rate of regeneration of the resource and 𝐼𝑡𝑠  is the net 
investment in the resource base. Other assumptions include: Non-renewable resources 
regeneration rate is zero for all  𝑆𝑡 , but for renewable resources it is positive. Individual derive 
utility from consumption and disutility from labor supply.  
Applying the method suggested by Arrow et al. (2003), genuine investment can be 
converted into estimate of growth in genuine wealth per capita. This is possible by converting the 
estimate of average genuine investment (ANS) on percentage of GNI into a growth of genuine 
wealth by multiplying by a presumed GNI-wealth ratio (𝜐). Ratios of 0.2 has been suggested for 
industrialized countries and 0.15 for developing and oil-rich countries (Arrow et al., 2004). 
Population growth rate (𝑛) is then deducted from the coefficient left. Empirically, the measure of 
sustainability is presented as: 𝑑𝑔𝑤𝑑𝑡𝑔𝑤 =  𝐺𝐼𝐺𝑁𝐼  𝜐 − 𝑛                                                                                                                                  (4) 
Where 𝑔𝑤 represents genuine wealth per capita, υ is the presumed ratio and 𝑛 is rate of 
population growth. 
The analogies presented above suggests that growth in genuine wealth per capita is a 
function of the productive base or economic related factors, the shadow prices of resources and 
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the institutions that govern resource allocation (𝑎). For the purpose of statistical analysis and data 
availability, the study employs an unbalanced panel approach on the selected 22 countries in Africa 
from 1996 to 2013. Using the two dependent variables, growth per capital GDP and the computed 
genuine wealth per capita, the baseline specification assumes the following panel model: 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡13𝑗=2 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (5)   
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent variables genuine wealth per capita and GDP growth 
per capita,  𝑖  is a country index and 𝑡 is the time dimension. Visible from the model is an error 
term with three sub-components: 𝜇𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved country-specific effects of 
sustainability that is stationary; 𝛾𝑡 stands for the common time specific shocks to sustainability, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved determinants of sustainability that vary over time in a country. Corruption 
is measured by perception corruption index (CPI). The variables institutions, stocks (growth-
related factors) and shadow are the categories of control variables espoused by the growth theory 
in contemporary literature. Every attempt is made to lag these variables to account for persistence. 
It should be pointed out that previous studies on the corruption – development dichotomy 
are predominantly based on one estimation technique, say ordinary least square (OLS) estimation, 
which focuses on parameter estimates at the conditional mean. More so, conventional OLS may 
be misleading when there are serious issues regarding endogeneity. OLS losses its credibility in 
the wake of these challenges. Both the conventional fixed effects and OLS estimators according 
to Nickell (1981) becomes inconsistent when the time span is small (Phillips & Sul, 2007). Bearing 
these in mind, we employed three estimation techniques for consistency in robustness: pooled 
OLS, fixed effects and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The GMM technique estimates 
the parameter of linear and nonlinear models in which the parameters are chosen to provide the 
best fit to multiple equations, each of which sets a sample moment to zero. The Two Staged Least 
Square (TSLS) estimator is a member of the class of GMM estimators of the linear model. In 
GMM, the coefficients are estimated by making the sample covariance between the regression 
error and the exogenous as small as possible. According to Stock and Watson (2007), when the 
errors are homoscedastic, the asymptotically efficient GMM estimator in the linear instrumental 
variable (IV) regression model is TSLS. We chose the GMM over the conventional IV due to its 
efficiency in the face of heteroskedasticity (see Han & Phillips, 2010) and in a bid to deal with 
endogeneity problem. To minimize collinearity, the condition numbers and variance inflation 
factors in each of the panel regressions were controlled to be lower than 100 and 10 respectively. 
 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
We begin the analysis with pooled OLS (POLS) estimates which provides a baseline 
effects. We compare the coefficients with the conventional fixed effects and GMM respectively. 
In the interpretation of the signs of the estimated coefficients, note should be taken of the fact that 
a negative inference on the governance indicators underscores the effect of worsening governance 
on the development outcomes being investigated. The dynamics of the connection between 
corruption and the two development outcomes are pretty much the same. However, one is more 
comprehensive and seem to magnify the enormity of the impact whiles the other does not. Thus a 
negative inference on the impact of corruption on sustainability simply imply a reduction in the 
inter-temporal social welfare over time, and it cuts across the four dimensions of sustainability. 
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But on economic development, it is possible a negative inference is an indication economically, 
there is a down turn on per capita GDP. The latter relation only give credence to one aspect of 
sustainability (economic dimension) but ignores concerns on environment, social and political 
strata. There are countries with low GDP outlook but in other sphere of the human endeavour, they 
are really doing well and are happy (e.g. Bhutan). We present the results in Table 3. 
Regressing only with the perceived level of corruption on economic and sustainable 
outcomes shows a negative effect on genuine wealth per capita whiles on per capita GDP, it is 
positive (see Figure A-2). We elucidate this finding from two perspectives: First, corruption may 
favor the few who are in key positions, and their wealth when placed in the basket for the 
estimation of GDP might give a misleading outlook to suggest the economy in the broader sense 
is doing well, but in reality deprivation and inequality may continue to linger to push ordinary 
citizens into the doldrums of poverty.  
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Table 3. Impact of corruption on development outcomes: POLS, Fixed Effects and GMM. 
  Pooled OLS Fixed Effects GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Economic Development 
Specification 1           
Constant   9.014 -19.148 -123.77*** 2.748 -19.921 -64.906** 2.315** -11.830 -18.801** 
 (4.713) (13.650) (32.890) (2.021) (13.304) (26.639) (1.025) (5.222) (8.968) 
Perceived corruption -0.286 -0.351 -0.088 -0.031 -0.507 -0.414 0.105 0.404* 0.637** 
 (0.669) (0.727) (0.701) (0.629) (0.684) (0.701) (0.273) (0.384) (0.493) 
Secondary Enrollment 0.289** 0.392***  0.0862 -0.047  -0.002 0.014 
  (0.140) (0.130)  (0.059) (0.082)  (0.021) (0.026) 
Government Effectiveness  -4.740*** -3.830**  -5.179*** -4.733***  -2.774** -2.875* 
  (1.668) (1.642)  (1.546) (1.619)  (1.199) (1.541) 
Economic Freedom  0.184 0.104  0.150 0.001   0.357*** 
  (0.191) (0.191)  (0.173) (0.184)   (0.108) 
Foreign Aid   -3.975***   -3.208**   -0.169 
   (1.407)   (1.424)   (0.938) 
Economic Prosperity   51.112***   33.499**   -1.051 
   (12.368)   (11.177)   (1.259) 
Press Freedom   0.046   -0.029   -0.003 
   (0.071)   (0.065)   (0.020) 
Natural Resources   0.152   0.070   0.189** 
   (0.126)   (0.122)   (0.096) 
Year Dummy No No No yes Yes Yes No No No 
Country Dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observation 142 72 109 142 119 109 142 119 109 
R2 0.158 0.210 0.393 0.001 0.008 0.0014 0.0012 0.047 0.185 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita. Robust Standard errors are presented in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
13 
 
Table 3. Impact of corruption on development outcomes: POLS, Fixed Effects and GMM (cont.…) 
  Pooled OLS Fixed Effects GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Sustainable Development 
Specification 2          
Constant    -1.655 0.514 -21.557** -1.657*** -3.293 -27.667*** -5.642 -14.893*** -10.548*** 
 (1.050) (3.119) (8.342) (0.449) (2.288) (5.918) (0.420) (3.253) (4.450) 
Perceived corruption -0.027 -0.136 -0.294* -0.007 -0.159 -0.308** -1.242 -0.682** -0.273** 
 (0.150) (0.169) (0.167) (0.139) (0.161) (0.154) (0.132) (0.291) (0.135) 
Secondary Enrollment  -0.053 -0.051*  0.014 -0.029  0.015 -0.035 
  (0.032) (0.031)  (0.014) (0.018)  (0.009) (0.026) 
Government Effectiveness  -0.281 -0.285  -0.041 0.086  -0.545 -2.397*** 
  (0.558) (0.545)  (0.521) (0.496)  (0.516) (0.705) 
Economic Freedom  -0.007 -0.045  0.028 -0.018  0.178*** -0.066 
  (0.044) (0.045)  (0.040) (0.041)  (0.059) (0.046) 
Foreign Aid   -1.042***   -0.819***   -0.049 
   (0.335)   (0.317)   (0.497) 
Economic prosperity   6.072**   7.901***   3.318*** 
   (3.078)   (2.456)   (1.102) 
Press Freedom   0.001   0.000   -0.016 
   (0.017)   (0.014)   (0.020) 
Natural Resources   -0.080***   -0.070***   -0.084*** 
   (0.030)   (0.027)   (0.031) 
Year Dummy  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes   No    No   No   
country dummy No  No  No  Yes   Yes   Yes   No  No   No   
Observation 140 118 108 140 118 108 140 118 108 
R2 0.880 0.882 0.906 0.472 0.255 0.494 0.472 0.572 0.698 
Note: Dependent variable is genuine wealth per capita. Robust Standard errors are presented in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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For instance, Nigeria is known to be one of the wealthiest economies in Africa, and yet this 
wealth is controlled by the top 1% leaving more than 90% of its population in hardcore 
poverty (Aderounmu, 2015). Secondly, the activities of the few in key positions abusing offices 
for personal gains have an enormous consequences on the political, social, economic and 
environmental landscape of an economy which could undermine posterity. Thus the negative 
relation amplifies a decrease in the inter-temporal welfare of the populace over time. 
Contrary to mainstream literature (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Ugur, 2014), there were 
no evidence to suggest corruption reduces economic development in Table 3. Corruption rather 
had a positive effect on economic development when inferred from the GMM technique. 
Consistently across the three techniques but for the GMM, the relationship was insignificant. 
Focusing on the host of other variables used in this paper, especially under the POLS when 
simultaneously controlling for year and country fixed effects, we find human capita (secondary 
enrollment) to be significantly relevant in SSA economic trajectory, but such relationship is 
inconsistent across the techniques. Yet one of the governance indicators (government 
effectiveness) is seen to dampen economic progress as it consistently had a negative sign across 
the estimators. We thus argue that the pace of development in SSA can be attributed to worsening 
governance systems that stems from the quality of public services and the degree to which public 
institutions are independent from political pressures. Column (3) of the POLS and GMM estimates 
provide further evidence on the debate on the ostensible impact of foreign aid on Africa’s 
development journey. Indeed, contrary to what many proponents alludes to, foreign aid reduces 
economic growth in the region from the negative sign. This evidence has two implications: (1) 
donors of development aid do not necessarily pay attention to better or worse institutions in most 
cases. Aids are given to protect the interest of the donor which in most cases are not made known 
to the general public, (2) donor conditions are implicitly skewed to their advantage no matter the 
superficial impact the said aid is supposed to have on certain outcomes in the recipient economy. 
However, when the element of sustainability is considered using genuine wealth per capita, 
the impact shows a negative relationship consistently across the three techniques. The impact of 
government effectiveness and foreign aid corroborates earlier results by negatively affecting 
sustainable outcome in the broader sense. We expound on this perspective by arguing that 
development aid tends to distort economies in Africa and may potentially slow sustainable growth 
indirectly. For instance, aid has the propensity to dampen domestic revenue mobilization, and 
systematically increase inflation in the recipient economies in the absence of sound economic 
policies from strong institutions. This contrast what other seminal researchers have converged at, 
suggesting foreign aid has a long-term effects on desirable outcomes (Arndt et al., 2011; 
Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007). Moreover, although resource endowment is significant to imply 
it is relevant in SSA development outcomes, it should be emphasized that such impact is 
consistently negative on sustainability. The inference regarding sustainable outcome provides 
evidence that supports the “resource-curse” hypothesis theorized in other studies. Two reasons 
may have accounted for this: (1) probable reflection of dynamic Dutch disease effects and, (2) 
incentives for rent-seeking in resource-rich economies.  
Economic prosperity is positively associated with both sustainable and economic 
development. This is possible as most African countries have experienced double digit growth in 
recent years. This growth is propelled by the insatiable demand for natural resources such as 
minerals, oil and gas by emerging economies in Asia (e.g. China). 
 
 
15 
 
Table 4. Corruption and development in Sub-Sahara Africa: GMM estimation 
  Sustainable Development Economic Development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coefficients of corresponding instrumental variable     
Variable Instrumented           
Ethnic Fractionalization -5.618 -6.993 -0.966 -29.199*** -21.830*** 47.302* 18.113 -12.746 99.442*** 192.373*** 
 (6.693) (6.287) (1.501) (3.111) (3.815) (20.178) (13.810) (17.786) (26.500) (21.981) 
Instruments           
Perceived Corruption -0.247*** -0.289** -0.091*** -0.060*** 0.083 0.374 1.342** 2.257*** -1.422*** -1.138** 
 (0.233) (0.229) (0.082) (0.067) (0.085) (0.836) (0.603) (0.711) (0.355) (0.492) 
Secondary Enrollment -0.074*** -0.054** 0.007 -0.081*** -0.040* 0.167* 0.175*** -0.140 -0.095 0.419*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010) (0.0213) (0.099) (0.055) (0.125) (0.087) (0.123) 
Economic Freedom -0.036 -0.086** -0.072*** 0.034*** 0.016 -0.115 -0.270*** 0.006 0.003 -0.230*** 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.074) (0.081) (0.149) (0.071) (0.064) 
Press Freedom -0.036*** 
-
0.036*** -0.018*** 0.000 -0.0002 -0.049** -0.024* -0.044** -0.131*** -0.140*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) 
Economic Prosperity -1.320 -1.037 -0.052 9.025*** 8.198 -14.138*** -11.453*** -10.544*** -40.016*** -50.457*** 
 (1.335) (1.244) (0.154) (0.843) (0.757) (3.261) (2.936) (2.359) (7.550) (4.363) 
Natural Resources -0.093*** 
-
0.101*** -0.080*** -0.097*** -0.114*** -0.229*** -0.105* -0.014 -0.004 -0.217*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.036) (0.057) (0.090) (0.038) (0.048) 
Foreign Aid  0.636 1.060***    2.334*** 0.132   
  (0.415) (0.098)    (0.802) (1.473)   
CPI*Institutional quality   0.275*** 0.325*** 0.316***   0.161 0.779 0.660* 
   (0.053) (0.058) (0.052)   (0.637) (0.508) (0.301) 
Population Growth    2.947 3.087    -8.374*** -6.606*** 
    (0.257) (0.205)    (2.325) (1.180) 
British colonial heritage     0.284*     3.582*** 
     (0.115)     (0.665) 
Constant 14.204*** 11.209 -4.281*** -9.497*** -13.827*** 9.749 13.863 53.567*** 70.191*** 15.593 
 (2.981) (3.349) (1.089) (1.314) (1.861) (13.034) (9.267) (12.585) (10.498) (10.722) 
Hausman Test     15.25     15.30 
     [0.67]     [0.60] 
Anderson Canon 18.76 11.25 9.98 13.34 19.11 17.88 14.55 16.74 16.90 18.10 
Correlation LM Statistics [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observation 116 120 120 116 116 116 120 120 116 116 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parenthesis; p-value in brackets * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
16 
 
Note should be taken that the major drawback to the causal inference in Table 3 could stem 
from endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Therefore, to address this, we resort to the IV within 
GMM regression as emphasized in section 3. As a result, two concerns are tackled in this section: 
(1) the ability of the exogenous components of development to explain Africa’s trajectory, (2) the 
capacity of ethno-linguistic fractionalization instrument to explain development outcomes through 
its effects on institutional efficiency. We instrumented with ethno-linguistic fractionalization as 
shown in Table 4. All the other variables are thereafter used as exogenous variables to assess the 
channels of development. 
We further interact corruption with institutional quality to assess whether it can dampen 
the positive effect of corruption on economic development whiles increasing the coefficient of 
sustainability. In congruence with our prior thought, the interaction effect decreases the 
coefficients of corruption on sustainable development whiles on economic development, we find 
it inconclusive.   Interestingly, there is a change on the coefficient of corruption but no effect on 
the sign on the sustainability strand. Yet on economic development, there is a change in both 
coefficient and the sign. These changes could possibly be viewed and explained from the 
perspective of the performance of some countries in the fight against corruption. Theoretically, 
there is growing awareness on the need to fight corruption, but in practice there is apathy on the 
part of institutions mandated to do so. The level of impunity could possibly be responsible for the 
changes in the coefficients. Sitting governments are in most cases shielded and protected by 
institutions whose heads were appointed by the executive branch of government. 
The regression results are in fact congruence with earlier ones in Table 3. However, a 
further assessment of the impact of colonial heritage on development points to a positive 
relationship. We explain the ensuing result from the perspective of the efficiency of British 
administrative machinery as opposed to the French legacy which encourages corruption. After 
independence, British colonies were allowed to carve their own trajectory. That was not the case 
of the French. Through the system of assimilation, colonies were made to be semi-autonomous 
allowing France to continue to meddle and dictate the course of actions and inactions policy 
makers should embark. However, regressing colonial heritage and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization on openness exclusively point to a negative relationship on both explanatory 
variables. That notwithstanding, linking this analogy to the negative influence of economic 
freedom on sustainable and economic development has the implication to suggest SSA slow pace 
could be attributed to inherited administrative machinery from colonial legacy. 
  
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
In this paper, we have shown that the impact of corruption on development may not 
necessarily be homogenous. Our optimism rest on how development may be conceptualized. We 
as a result reexamines and compares between corruption and two but related development 
outcomes:  economic and sustainable development in Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Our finding is quite robust. It holds in POLS, Fixed effects and GMM within IV settings; 
and it also holds for different measures of institutions and different measures of development using 
per capita income for economic development on one hand, and genuine wealth per capita for 
sustainable development on another. Taking stock of major policy blue-prints of selected countries 
in the region on the fight against corruption, we are able to point out that institutional effectiveness 
play an important role in providing the much needed shock absorbers on the devastation caused 
by corruption. Overall, through this comparison, we are able to signal that both incidental and 
systematic corruption poses a long-term threat to sustainable development and that Africa’s poor 
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choices of economic policy over the last four decades could be as a result of inherited 
administrative machinery from colonial heritage. Thus, there is the need to intensify efforts in 
reforming existing institutions to make them more assertive to rise up to the development needs of 
the region. We also propose the development trajectory of SSA ought to be assessed on the basis 
of sustainability and not just on spontaneity as has been the norm using GDP. This will create 
better awareness on the true state of investment and disinvestment in the productive base of each 
economy and at the same time portray the economy in the light of whether the inter-temporal 
welfare of intergenerational citizens are on the rise or plummeting. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A-1. Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries 
 
Variables Years Description Mean Std. Dev. Source 
 
 PANEL A: Summary Statistics 
 
  
Corruption Index 1996-2013 Perceived level of corruption. Countries ranked on a scale of 10 (very 
clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) 3.181 1.143 
Transparency 
International 
GDP per cap 1970-2013 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency 1.114 6.776 World Bank 
Genuine wealth 1980-2013 True level of investment and disinvestment in the productive base of 
an economy after adjustments -2.245 2.384 World Bank 
Secondary ENR 1970-2013 Total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age 25.063 20.398 World Bank 
Population  Growth 1970-2013 Exponential rate of growth of midyear population 2.663 0.852 World Bank 
Natural Resources 1970-2013 Sum of all rents (natural gas, coal  (hard and soft), mineral, and forest) 11.967 13.755 World Bank 
Foreign Aid 1970-2013 Logarithm of Aid inflow is the transfer of capital for the benefit of 
recipient country or its population 8.147 0.742 World Bank 
Economic Prosperity 1970-2013 A proxy of natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product in a given country (constant, 2005 US$) 2.817 0.381 World Bank 
Gov't Effectiveness 1996-2013 
The quality of public services,  civil service and the degree of 
independence from political pressures, ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, higher  
values=  better governance outcomes 
-0.290 0.523 WGI 
Economic Freedom 1998-2013 
A measure of the fundamental right of every human to control labor 
and property. Countries ranked on a scale of 100 (very free) to 0 (less 
free). 
57.826 5.118 Heritage Foundation 
British heritage 1970-2013 Dummy variable for countries that have been under British control                0.642 0.480 World Flag 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fract.  1961-1995 
The probability that two randomly selected individuals in the 
population belong to different groups 0.758 0.125 
Alesina et al. (2002) 
and Roeder (2001) 
Press Freedom 1996-2013 The degree to which country permits the free flow of news and information. Scored from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) 45.237 14.780 Freedom House 
Institutional quality 1996-2013  Aggregate governance indicators -0.220 0.480 WGI 
  PANEL B: Presentation of countries (22) 
 
  
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Cameroun, Kenya, Congo, Rep., Nigeria, South Africa, Mali, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Liberia, Senegal, Togo 
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Namibia 
Source: Authors’ construct  
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Table A-2. Correlation Matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Corruption (1) 1              
Genuine wealth (2) 0.687* 1             
GDP per capita (3) 0.034 0.151* 1            
Secondary ENR (4) 0.664* 0.264* 0.024 1           
Gov. Effectiveness (5) 0.747* 0.635* -0.059 0.588* 1          
British Heritage (6) 0.040 0.106* 0.009 0.132* 0.176* 1         
Ethnic Fractionalization (7) -0.680* -0.217* -0.265* -0.066 -0.394 -0.102 1        
Press freedom (8) -0.619* -0.340* -0.059 -0.365* -0.477* -0.231* 0.631* 1       
Foreign Aid (9) -0.293* 0.017 0.039 0.228* -0.260* 0.039 0.015 0.054 1      
Economic Prosperity (10) 0.672* 0.270* 0.036 0.683* 0.648* 0.174* 0.290* -0.314* -0.012 1     
Natural Resources (11) -0.293* -0.613* -0.050 0.092* -0.417* -0.083* 0.231* 0.085 -0.031 -0.027 1    
Population Growth (12) -0.640* 0.687* 0.034 0.664* -0.597* 0.124* 0.171* 0.326* -0.021 -0.030 -0.030 1   
Institutional quality (13) 0.502* 0.453* -0.173 0.276* 0.712* 0.016 -0.699* -0.382* -0.060 0.166 -0.555* -0.159 1  
Economic Freedom (14) 0.724* 0.677* 0.037 0.618* 0.838* 0.248* -0.720* -0.418* -0.220* -0.012 -0.517* 0.326* 0.696* 1 
Note: Significant at * P < 0.05 
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Figure A-1. Trend of Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) and Genuine Wealth per capita in selected 
countries, Average (1988-2013) 
 
Source: Authors’ construct 
 
Figure A-2. Perceived Corruption and Development outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ construct 
Note: The relationship between corruption and the two development outcomes appears to be 
approximately linear in SSA. 
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